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T he goal of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is to provide a safety net for individuals who must stop working because of a disability. However, there is a significant hole in the structure of that safety net with respect to 
health care coverage and access to care: although Medicare coverage is available to people with disabilities, they must wait 
for that coverage until 24 months after they become eligible for SSDI.2 In this issue brief, we discuss the costs and benefits 
associated with eliminating the 24-month Medicare waiting period for new SSDI beneficiaries.
Background
Considerable attention has been paid to the health insurance status of SSDI beneficiaries in the 24-month Medicare wait-
ing period, primarily because many new beneficiaries are particularly vulnerable to high health care costs that immediate 
enrollment in Medicare could help defray. Studies based on focus groups and interviews with people with disabilities have 
illustrated very poignantly their hardships during this waiting period. At a time when health insurance coverage is needed 
most—when individuals have lost their health, jobs, income, and, for many, access to affordable health insurance—federal 
law requires them to wait two full years to become eligible for Medicare. Many uninsured SSDI beneficiaries in the Medi-
care waiting period skip medications, postpone needed care, become depressed and anxious about the future, and express a 
sense that they are not in control of their own lives. Others experience severe financial hardships and are unable to maintain 
employer-sponsored coverage under COBRA provisions during the waiting period because of very high premiums (Williams 
et al. 2004; Hayes et al. 2007).
Since 1972, when Medicare was first expanded to cover SSDI beneficiaries, disability advocates and members of Congress 
have unsuccessfully fought to reduce or eliminate the waiting period. In implementing the two-year waiting period, Congress 
wished to “proceed on a conservative basis,” striving to keep costs down, avoid private coverage crowd-out, and ensure 
that only those with long-lasting disabilities were given access to the benefits. Congress was also concerned about creating 
greater incentives for workers to exit the workforce and apply for SSDI benefits as well as dealing with difficulties in admin-
istering a retroactive benefit (Whittaker 2005).
SSDI Beneficiaries Before, During, and After the Waiting Period
Data from the 1994–1996 National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS), linked to SSDI and Medicare program data, were used 
to profile SSDI disabled-worker beneficiaries during the three years immediately preceding and following SSDI entry, includ-
ing the two years in which beneficiaries were in the Medicare waiting period (Livermore et al. 2009). Our findings indicate 
that beneficiaries experienced dramatic changes during this time, including marked declines in health and increases in health 
care utilization; a two-fold increase (after SSDI entry) in the share of beneficiaries living in households with incomes below 
1 Support for this research was provided by the Commonwealth Fund. The views presented here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the  
Commonwealth Fund or its directors, officers, or staff.
2 Exceptions to the 24-month waiting period include new SSDI beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease (eligible for Medicare after a 3-month waiting period) and 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (eligible for Medicare without a waiting period).
2the federal poverty level; and an increase in health care 
access problems, with the peak spanning the years imme-
diately before and immediately after SSDI entry. We also 
found that an estimated 13 percent of entrants die before 
they complete the Medicare waiting period. These workers 
paid Medicare payroll taxes throughout their working lives 
but never received any benefit.
Changes in health insurance coverage during the period 
surrounding SSDI entry are particularly relevant to policy 
discussions regarding eliminating or reducing the 24-month 
waiting period. Table 1 provides information about how 
key sources of health insurance coverage change during 
this period. As a group, SSDI beneficiaries experience high 
rates of uninsurance until the third year after SSDI entry. 
A marked decline in own-employer coverage over the 
same period is offset by an increase in Medicaid coverage. 
Employer-sponsored coverage through a family member 
declines somewhat during the period preceding SSDI entry 
but remains fairly constant thereafter.3 
Another relevant issue is that most beneficiaries become 
entitled to SSDI retroactively—that is, their official SSDI 
entitlement month (the month in which their benefits begin) 
typically precedes their SSDI award month (the month in 
which their award decision is made). This is because it can 
sometimes take many months—or even years—before an 
SSDI claim is allowed. The average processing time for 
a disability claim at the initial decision level is about 90 
days (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007), and 
processing times are substantially longer for claims that are 
initially denied and then subsequently allowed during the 
appeals process. Also, those who are eventually allowed 
SSDI benefits might not file a disability claim immediately 
following the onset of disability. Hence, by the time SSDI 
beneficiaries are notified that their claim has been allowed, 
many have completed all or part of the Medicare wait-
ing period. We found that 11 percent of beneficiaries had 
completed the entire waiting period by the time their claim 
was allowed, and another 25 percent had one year or less 
remaining. On average, people in our study sample had 
about 15 months (or 63 percent) of the 24-month period 
remaining as of the SSDI allowance month (Livermore et 
al. 2009). 
These findings indicate that, for many, elimination of 
the Medicare waiting period would not help them imme-
diately upon SSDI entry; although SSDI cash benefits can 
be awarded retroactively, retroactive Medicare coverage 
would presumably be of much less value to the beneficiary 
because it would not be available at the time treatment 
decisions are being made. 
Costs and Benefits of Eliminating the  
Waiting Period
We estimate that eliminating the Medicare waiting period 
would increase annual Medicare costs (including Part 
D) by approximately $14 billion, provided that all SSDI 
beneficiaries are enrolled throughout the entire 24-month 
period (Table 2).4 This represents about three percent of 
total Medicare program expenditures in 2006. Thus, while 
$14 billion is a large increase in Medicare expenditures for 
SSDI beneficiaries, it represents a relatively small share of 
total program costs.5
Although the $14 billion estimate is based on the as-
sumption that all beneficiaries would be enrolled in Medi-
care throughout the 24-month waiting period, for many 
Table 1. Selected Sources of Health Insurance Coverage of Disabled Workers Before and After  
SSDI Entry
Prior to SSDI Entry After SSDI Entry
25–36 
Months 
13–24 
Months
1–12 
Months
1–12 
Months
13–24 
Months
25–36 
Months
Source of Health Insurance (%)
None (uninsured) 22 21 23 23 17 4
Medicaid 6 7 8 17 21 29
Own employer 40 41 37 26 21 16
Family member’s employer 39 37 33 30 35 31
Source:  Livermore et al. 2009.
Note:  SSDI beneficiary cohorts include NHIS sample members age 18-64 who became entitled to SSDI based on their own work histories within 36 months (before or after) 
the month the household was interviewed in the NHIS. The SSDI entitlement (entry) month is based on the date associated with the latest entitlement occurring during 
the 36-month period before and after the interview month. Health insurance coverage status could not be ascertained for approximately 10 percent of sample members 
in each SSDI entitlement cohort. Percentages do not sum to 100 because not all sources are shown and because individuals may have multiple sources of coverage.
3 The decline in employer-sponsored coverage via a family member—from 39 percent in the third year prior to SSDI entry to 30 percent in the first year after 
entry—is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The shares reporting this type of coverage during the three periods after SSDI entry are not statistically different. 
4  Details of the cost estimation methodology are provided in Appendix C of Livermore et al. (2009).
5  Our estimate of the cost of eliminating the full Medicare waiting period is substantially higher than those developed in previous studies (Dale and Verdier 2003; 
Riley 2004). The differences are primarily due to medical cost inflation, the inclusion of Medicare Part D costs in our estimates, and growth in the annual number of 
SSDI awards since the previous studies were conducted. 
3beneficiaries, coverage would likely not take effect until the 
month of their SSDI award—on average, the ninth month 
of the waiting period. If medical costs are distributed uni-
formly over the entire waiting period, the cost of Medicare 
coverage during the waiting period and commencing with 
the SSDI award month would be only 62.5 percent of the 
cost of coverage for the full 24 months, or an estimated 
$8.7 billion. This estimate would be lower if higher health 
care costs in the first 12 months after SSDI eligibility were 
taken into account (Livermore et al. 2009). But the estimate 
would be higher if we assume that beneficiaries might delay 
some care until Medicare coverage becomes available. 
Another factor to consider when estimating the cost of 
eliminating the waiting period is the expected reduction in 
Medicaid expenditures for SSDI beneficiaries during that 
period. Information on Medicaid coverage for SSDI benefi-
ciaries during the waiting period is poor, and we think our 
estimates (shown in Table 1) are likely to be low. Based on 
several sources, we assume that 25 to 35 percent of SSDI 
beneficiaries in the waiting period have Medicaid coverage 
in any given month once their claims have been allowed 
(see Appendix C of Livermore et al. 2009). Elimination of 
the waiting period would reduce federal expenditures for 
Medicaid by an estimated $2 billion to $2.8 billion ($1.3 
billion to $1.8 billion if coverage were not retroactive).
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2008) esti-
mates that phased elimination of the Medicare waiting pe-
riod would increase federal outlays, net of federal Medicaid 
savings and revenue increases, by $11.6 billion in 2013 (the 
first post phase-in year in the CBO projection) in current- 
year dollars or $10.2 billion in 2006 dollars (for purposes 
of comparison to our estimates).6 This estimate is higher 
than our $7.4 billion estimate for elimination of the wait-
ing period without retroactive eligibility and lower than our 
$12 billion estimate with full retroactive eligibility. The dif-
ferences between these estimates and that of CBO appear to 
reflect the following: (1) CBO assumes a partial retroactive 
benefit (for Part A only, and with very limited use by those 
with private coverage); (2) the CBO estimate of Medic-
aid savings is somewhat higher; (3) CBO projects small 
increases in tax revenues because of reductions in employer 
health care expenses that translate into higher wages; (4) 
CBO’s estimate for Medicare expenditures per beneficiary, 
based on average expenditures for all Medicare beneficia-
ries, does not adjust for the extraordinarily high health care 
utilization concurrent with SSDI entry, whereas our own 
methodology does; and (5) CBO projections are for a year 
when, under current policy, the number of beneficiaries in 
the waiting period would be larger than in 2006.7
However, our cost estimates might be too low for a 
couple of reasons. First, elimination of the waiting period 
would crowd out some private insurance coverage. But our 
findings regarding the health insurance coverage of ben-
eficiaries before and during the waiting period suggest that 
this crowd-out would be limited. Own-employer coverage 
is already low during the waiting period, and it drops by 
only 10 percentage points from the first year of the wait-
ing period to the first year after the waiting period. Private 
coverage via a family member remains essentially un-
changed over the same period (Table 1). This suggests that 
the reduction in private coverage in response to Medicare 
eligibility will be no more than 10 percent. The expendi-
ture models used to produce our estimates indicate that, 
on average, expenditures for those in the waiting period 
with private coverage would be about $2,900 less than for 
those without private coverage. Therefore, crowd-out might 
add about $0.5 billion to $0.8 billion to our estimates for 
the full 24 months ($0.3 billion to $0.5 billion if coverage 
begins at SSDI award).
Another potential result of eliminating the waiting pe-
riod is an induced demand for SSDI—that is, more workers 
might apply for and receive SSDI because it would become 
a more attractive route to public health insurance. Given the 
increasing restrictiveness of private coverage for workers, 
some induced entry into both SSDI and Medicare seems 
quite likely. However, our findings do not shed light on 
the extent to which this would occur. Individuals who lack 
adequate private coverage and have significant health care 
needs are most likely to be induced to apply for SSDI as 
well as those who remain employed primarily to maintain 
coverage but otherwise gain relatively little from employ-
ment in terms of compensation or personal satisfaction. 
6  We used CBO’s Personal Consumption Expenditure index to deflate the CBO projections.  
7  CBO does not provide an estimate but starts with a figure of 1.8 million beneficiaries for December 2007, which is higher than our 1.66 million estimate for 2006 
(see Livermore et al. 2009). This number is likely to grow because of the aging of the baby boom generation.
Table 2. Estimated Annual Cost of Eliminating the Medicare Waiting Period for SSDI Beneficiaries,  
2006 Dollars
 24 Months of Coverage (Retroactive Coverage)
Coverage Begins at SSDI Award 
(Coverage Not Retroactive)
Annual Medicare cost of eliminating the 
waiting period $13.9 billion $8.7 billion
Net of offsetting federal Medicaid  
savings (range)
$11.1–$11.9 billion $6.9–$$7.4 billion
Source:  Livermore et al. 2009.
4For both groups, however, significant deterrents to SSDI 
entry would remain: the Social Security Administration’s 
medical eligibility standards; the five-month waiting period 
between disability onset and eligibility for benefits; the 
likelihood that it would take much longer than five months 
for approval of SSDI benefits; and the chance that the SSDI 
application will ultimately be denied, leaving the applicant 
without a job, let alone insurance. 
Induced demand for SSDI would be a nonissue if 
affordable and reliable health insurance coverage were 
universally available to workers with medical conditions 
that might lead to labor force exit and SSDI entry. There is 
some evidence that access to health insurance is an im-
portant factor in the labor force participation decisions of 
workers with disabilities (MacDonald-Wilson et al. 2003; 
Kreider and Riphahn 2000; Stapleton et al. 1998; Yelowitz 
1998). This evidence indicates that delinking eligibility for 
public health insurance from eligibility for federal disabil-
ity programs would promote employment among people 
with disabilities. If future health reforms make affordable 
health insurance coverage more available to workers at risk 
of leaving the labor force because of disability, there may 
be less induced demand for SSDI if the Medicare wait-
ing period were eliminated. Thus, the cost associated with 
induced demand reflects a failing of the current system for 
financing the health care of workers.
Although our estimates indicate that the cost of elimi-
nating the waiting period would be substantial, those costs 
need to be weighed against important potential benefits. 
First, fewer beneficiaries would delay or forgo needed 
health care because of out-of-pocket cost. Medicare cover-
age during the waiting period would allow a large number 
of individuals to obtain needed health care that they might 
forgo under current policy, at a time when their needs are 
quite substantial. 
Second, elimination of the waiting period would reduce 
the financial hardships experienced by individuals and their 
families who must pay high out-of-pocket costs for medi-
cal care due to lack of insurance, including those with high 
COBRA premiums.8 Indirect evidence of the burden of 
COBRA premiums comes from the 20 percentage point de-
cline in own-employer coverage from the second year prior 
to SSDI entitlement to the second year after (Table 1). It 
seems likely that a substantial share of this decline reflects 
an inability to pay the COBRA premiums.9 Those who 
cannot maintain COBRA coverage and do not have options 
through a spouse’s employer can resort to Medicaid if they 
meet the typically strict income and asset requirements, or 
else they go uninsured.
Third, eliminating the waiting period would reduce 
Medicaid program expenditures for states. The Medic-
aid savings noted earlier represent only the federal share. 
Annual state savings would likely be $1.5 billion to $2.1 
billion (Livermore et al. 2009).
Finally, better coverage and access to health care dur-
ing the waiting period might lead to improved health and 
increased or earlier return to work. There is some evidence 
that access to health care prior to Medicare eligibility is 
associated with reduced health care utilization and expen-
ditures after Medicare eligibility (McWilliams et al. 2007). 
Thus, earlier access to Medicare among SSDI beneficia-
ries might lead to reduced long-term Medicare program 
expenditures. If earlier access leads to improved health 
and increased return to work, federal payroll and income 
tax revenues would also increase, and perhaps more SSDI 
beneficiaries would exit for work. 
Implications for Broader Health Care Reform
As our discussion of induced demand suggests, elimination 
of the Medicare waiting period is an incomplete solution to 
a much larger problem with the current health care financing 
system. Many workers with disabilities or high-cost health 
conditions do not have adequate coverage, as evidenced by 
the fact that an estimated 22 percent of SSDI beneficiaries 
have no coverage in the three years prior to SSDI entry, and 
many forgo or delay care (Livermore et al. 2009). Improve-
ments in coverage and access for this broader group ought 
to be a critical issue for health care reform, in part because 
of the high need and in part because it would help some 
individuals stay in the labor force and avoid entry into SSDI. 
One important criterion for judging the adequacy of any 
health reform proposal is the extent to which it will meet the 
needs of workers with significant health conditions—and 
whether it will continue to meet their needs if they must exit 
the labor force and apply for SSDI.
8 Under COBRA, the individual typically pays the entire premium cost, which, in 2006, averaged about $350 per month for individual coverage (Claxton et al. 
2006). For people with disabilities, employers are permitted to charge up to 150 percent of the actual premium during the additional 11 months some individuals 
with disabilities are granted under COBRA, so premiums may be substantially higher.
9  Some may lose eligibility for COBRA coverage after 18 months if the extended coverage is not granted because the individual cannot establish that disability 
onset occurred during the first 60 days of COBRA coverage, a condition required for the additional 11 months of this coverage.
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